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Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Changing the Impact Rule in Indiana
In Kroger Co. v. Beck,1 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the fact
that plaintiff's throat had been pricked by a hypodermic needle hidden in
a piece of meat satisfied the contemporaneous physical impact require-
ment necessary to recover for emotional distress. The court, however,
noted in dictum that this requirement of impact may not be the soundest
possible rule.2 From this it appears that, given the right fact situation, at
least one Indiana court would be willing to abandon the impact rule in
favor of a sounder approach. Accordingly, this note analyzes other
jurisdictions' solutions to the problem of liability for emotional distress
and suggests an approach which would avoid their deficiencies.
THE IMPACT RULE
The impact rule provides that there can be no recovery for emotional
distress when there has been no immediate physical impact to the plain-
tiff.' The earliest courts considering emotional distress claims had
typically denied recovery because of lack of precedent.4 The impact rule
provided the needed transition from traditional physical injury cases to
emotional injury claims by keeping the new action for emotional distress
damages within the framework of the old action for physical damages. By
allowing recovery for emotional distress which accompanied physical in-
jury, the traditional concept of real physical injury was broadened to in-
clude such distress. Indiana adopted the impact rule in 18975 and, with
one exception,6 has retained the impact rule to the present day.7
I- Ind. App. -, 375 N.E.2d 640 (1978).
'Id at _, 375 N.E.2d at 645 n.5.
'See W. PROSSE%., LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328-30 (4th ed. 1971).
'E.g., Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355, 356 (1888).
'Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897).
6Indiana courts do not require a contemporaneous physical impact in tort actions where
the defendant's conduct is intentional and likely to provoke an emotional disturbance.
Montgomery v. Crm, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1928) (kidnap of plaintiff's child);
Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 (1902) (false imprisonment); Kline v. Kline, 158
Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902) (assault); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12
N.E.2d 360 (1938) (unauthorized autopsy on plaintiff's deceased husband).
'Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945); Boden v. Del-Mar
Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind.
479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922); Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Ray, 167 Ind. 236, 78 N.E. 978 (1906);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64,60 N.E. 674 (1901); Kroger Co. v. Beck, -
Ind. App. -, 375 N.E.2d 640 (1978); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, - Ind. App.
-, 357 N.E.2d 247 (1976); Jeffersonville Silgas, Inc. v. Wilson, 154 Ind. App. 398, 290
N.E.2d 113 (1972); Earle v. Porter, 112 Ind. App. 71, 40 N.E.2d 381 (1942); Gaskins v.
Runkle, 25 Ind. App. 584, 58 N.E. 740 (1900); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24
Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900).
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
Although many reasons have been stated for the adoption of the im-
pact rule, five reasons have been espoused most frequently. The first ra-
tionale for the rule is a fear of fraudulent claims.' The general feeling is
that a physical impact provides assurance that emotional distress has
actually occurred.' This reasoning has several flaws. First, the problem of
feigning injuries can be solved simply by testing the adequacy of the
proof of emotional injury in each case and denying recovery where the
proof of the genuineness of the injury is inadequate. 10 Second, today's
state of medical science makes accurate proof of emotional distress possi-
ble. " Moreover, although the fear of fraudulent claims is well founded,
the impact rule does nothing to separate the legitimate from the il-
legitimate claims: a contemporaneous physical impact does not assure
that the emotional distress claim is genuine, nor does absence of a
physical impact assure that the claim is fraudulent. 2
A second reason given for the adoption of the impact rule is the fear
that, without this restriction, courts will be drowned in a flood of emo-
tional distress litigation.13 William Prosser eloquently answers this argu-
ment when he writes:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a "flood of litigation"; and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice
to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too
much work to do.14
It also appears that the feared litigation deluge has not materialized in
jurisdictions not using the impact rule,15 and that the emotional distress
case load has been greater in the states that have followed the rule than
in those that have rejected it. 8 Moreover, if halting a potential flood of
8Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R, 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212
Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (1905); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
App. 374, 382-86, 56 N.E. 917, 920-21 (1900); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R.R., 18 Ind. App.
202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 698 (1897).
'Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, - Ind. App..... 357 N.E.2d 247, 253 (1976).
°W. PROSSER. supra note 3, at 328.
"Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 411-13, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1975); Comment,
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J.
1237, 1258-63 (1971).
'"Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 334, 150 A. 540, 543 (1930);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401 409-11, 261 A.2d 84, 87-89 (1970); Savard v. Cody
Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 409-10, 234 A.2d 656, 659 (1967).
13Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. Smith, - Ind. App. -, -, 357 N.E.2d 247, 253 (1976); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 382, 56 N.E. 917, 920-21 (1900); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.
R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 698 (1897).
"Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 877
(1939).
"E.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp. 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1969).
"Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 411-12, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970); Lambert, Tort
Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. REV. 584, 592 (1961).
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litigation should predominate over plaintiffs' rights to recover for emo-
tional distress, then all recovery for emotional distress should be denied,
even where there is a contemporaneous physical impact. Emotional
distress is no more real simply because there was an impact.
The third reason given for using the impact rule is the belief that, ab-
sent impact, cause in fact of the emotional distress cannot be shown.17
This argument can be answered simply by noting that an impact does not
show cause in fact of even the impact itself, but only the fact of the im-
pact; cause must be shown by other evidence and the inferences drawn
therefrom.
A fourth reason for the impact rule is that without it measurement of
the extent of emotional distress damages is uncertain and largely left to
speculation and conjecture. 8 This argument fails on several counts.
First, the presence of emotional distress is capable of clear medical
proof.1 9 Second, the courts allow recovery for physical pain, and for emo-
tional distress when accompanied by a physical injury, in spite of the
degree of speculation and conjecture involved,10 making impact signifi-
cant in law rather than in fact. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe
that requiring impact will lessen the degree of speculation and conjecture
involved in measuring emotional distress.
The fifth argument concerns proximate cause. One court adopting the
impact rule wrote: "The logical vindication of this rule, is that it is
unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to an-
ticipate and guard against fright and the consequences of fright .... ,
21
The weakness of this position is well illustrated by the fact situation of
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway,2 one of the leading cases adopting the im-
pact rule. In Mitchell, a team of runaway horses was halted so close to the
pregnant plaintiff that she stood between their heads; as a result of
severe fright she subsequently miscarried. The court denied recovery
because of the absence of impact. It is difficult to understand why fright,
in such a situation, is neither a natural result nor to be expected. Further-
more, had one of defendant's horses knocked the plaintiff over, such im-
pact would not necessarily have shown more clearly defendant's anticipa-
"Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Bosley v. An-
drews, 393 Pa. 161, 169, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (1958); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart,
24 Ind. App. 374, 389, 56 N.E. 917, 922 (1900).
'Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110,45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 66, 60 N.E. 674, 675 (1901); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. Smith, - Ind. App.., -, 357 N.E. 247, 255 (1976); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 382-86, 56 N.E. 917, 920-21 (1900); Kalen v. Terre Haute &
I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 698 (1897).
"Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 498-506
(1922).
2°Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 149 N.C. 158, 163, 62 S.E. 890, 892 (1908); Kavanagh
v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 144, 221 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1966); Dallas & Mavis Forwarding
Co. v. Liddell, 126 Ind. App. 113, 117, 126 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1955).
"Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
"2151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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tion of fright. Under such circumstances, it is illogical to condition plain-
tiff's recovery on an actual impact: if it is truly unreasonable to require
defendants to anticipate and guard against fright, there should be no
recovery for emotional distress at all. In adopting the impact rule the
courts are trying to avoid subjecting defendants to unlimited liability for
emotional distress damages;2 3 however, there is no logical reason for
limiting liability at the point of impact.
These five reasons for requiring impact represent legitimate fears.
Fraudulent claims, a flood of litigation, speculation and conjecture,
absence of cause in fact, and absence of proximate causation are all pro-
blems which must be met and dealt with; howe'er, as has been shown, re-
quiring an impact does not guarantee the genuineness of claims, close the
floodgates of litigation, lessen speculation and conjecture, show cause in
fact of emotional distress, or provide proximate causation. Consequently,
only a few states have retained the impact rule.2 4
THE ZONE OF DANGER RULE
A standard which many jurisdictions have adopted is the zone of
danger rule.25 This rule provides that, as a minimum prerequisite to
recovery, plaintiff must have been within the range of ordinary physical
23E.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 288-89, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
"Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 819 (Fla. 1977); Gilliam v. Stewart,
291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Benza v.
Shulman Air Freight, 46 Il. App. 3d 521, 361 N.E.2d 91 (1977); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.W. 333 (1925); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Bain, 161
Ky. 44, 170 S.W. 499 (1914); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897)
(Although Spade has not been overruled it has been questioned. See George v. Jordan
Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 246-48, 268 N.E.2d 915, 916-17 (1971)); Howard v. Bloodworth,
137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, - Ind.
App. -, 357 N.E.2d 247 (1976); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E.
694 (1897); McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095
(1915).
"Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); McGovern v. Piccolo, 33
Conn. Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (1976); Rob v. Pennsylvania R.R, 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709
(1965); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Orkina v. Midwestern Corp.,
282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W. 2d 259 (1965); (Okrina recognizes that Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry.;
48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892), in adopting a zone of danger requirement, is now the
law of Minnesota. 282 Minn. 400, 403-05, 165 N.W.2d 259, 262-63 (1965). The Okrina case
makes clear that a physical injury resulting from a fear for one's own safety is necessary to
recover for emotional distress in Minnesota. IL at 404, 165 N.W.2d at 262.) Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt.
116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
Rhode Island has chosen to maintain the zone of danger rule, in general, and carve out
exceptions to the rule where necessary. See D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338
A.2d 524 (1975).
The law in Louisiana regarding the negligent infliction of emotional distress is in a
somewhat confused state. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App.
1961). uses a duty approach to determine liability; however, subsequent cases distinguish
Holland by limiting it to its narrow fact situation. See, e.g., Hickman v. Parish of E. Baton
Rouge, 314 So. 2d 486 (La. App. 1975). It appears from Bourque v. American Mut. Liab.
[Vol. 54:467
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peril."' In the leading case upholding the zone of danger rule, Tobin v.
Grossman,27 the court admits that the fears of fraudulent claims, a flood
of litigation, speculation and conjecture, and an absence of proximate
cause 8 are no longer cogent reasons for requiring impact in emotional
distress cases. However, because of the fear of unlimited liability, the
New York court limits recovery to situations where plaintiff is in the zone
of physical danger.2 9
The Tobin court recognizes that the zone of danger requirement is an
arbitrary limitation, but justifies this limitation as the only way to pre-
vent unlimited liability.3 0 The court is saying that unlimited liability
outweighs the value of compensating plaintiffs for legitimate emotional
distress claims. To prevent unlimited liability the Tobin court extends
liability from its complete denial, past the admittedly arbitrary point of
impact, to the equally arbitrary zone of danger, beyond which the court
chops it off. But one wonders why the impact-rule-courts think plaintiffs
who sustain a contemporaneous impact are more deserving of recovery
than plaintiffs who are merely in the zone of danger, and why the Tobin
court thinks that plaintiffs within the zone of danger are more deserving
of recovery than plaintiffs who are outside the zone.
The fact situation in Dillon v. Legg3 illustrates what the California
court called the "hopeless artificiality" of the zone of danger rule.32 In
Dillon, Erin Dillon was killed by a negligent motorist while her mother
and sister watched. The sister was arguably within the zone of danger
while the mother was not. The zone of danger rule would require granting
the sister relief for emotional distress sustained as a result of witnessing
the death, but deny the mother the same recovery simply because she
stood a few yards away.
Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 1977) that Louisiana is now using at least a form of the
zone of danger rule.
"Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559
(1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 612-13, 268 N.W. 497, 500-01 (1935); Resavage
v. Davies, 199 Md. App. 479, 487, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (1952).
2724 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). The Tobin court does not ex-
plicitly call New York's rule the zone of danger rule, but, in essence, this is precisely what it
is. Since Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) held
that physical impact was no longer necessary to recover for emotional distress, the role of
the Tobin court was to determine how far recovery might go. In drawing the line the Tobin
court held that one could not recover for unintentional harm resulting solely from injuries
inflicted upon another. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 611, 249 N.E.2d 419, 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555
(1969). The court concluded, "It is enough that the law establishes liability in favor of
those directly or intentionally harmed." Id- at 619, 176 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
Without requiring impact and without allowing bystander recovery, those directly harmed
could only be those who feared for their own personal safety. This is in fact the zone of
danger rule.
"These fears are four of the five reasons that courts have most frequently given for
adopting the impact rule. See supra note 8-23 and accompanying text.
2924 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
"Id. at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
3168 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
3 1d at 733. 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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If the danger of unlimited liability outweighs the value of compen-
sating plaintiffs for legitimate claims, then the more logical approach
would be to deny recovery in toto, and not allow it to turn on such ar-
bitrary distinctions as an impact or presence within a zone of danger. In
Dillon v. Legg, Justice Tobriner wrote: "In substance, [the zone of danger
proponents] say, definition of liability being impossible, denial of liability
is the only realistic alternative. 3 3 Although Justice Tobriner's conclu-
sion is the logical one, it is not the one adopted by the zone of danger pro-
ponents: they would not deny all emotional distress liability, but rather
let liability turn on the arbitrary distinction of whether or not plaintiff is
in the zone of peril.3 4 The zone of danger rule has been considered to be a
mere extension of the impact rule because the requirement of being
within the zone of peril merely assures that one fears the danger of im-
pact. Consequently, the zone of danger rule carries with it all of the short-
comings of the impact rule.3 5
THE FORESEEABILITY TEST
The English case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas,8
decided in 1888, has generally been recognized as inspiring the impact
rule in the United States 7 and was explicitly considered in Indiana's
initial adoption of the impact rule,3 8 although the validity of so citing
Coultas is questionable. 39 The King's Bench declined to require an impact
thirteen years later in Dulieu v. White & Sons40 and adopted instead a
zone of danger rule.41 The zone of danger rule, however, had a short life as
well in English law and was abandoned in 1925 in Hambrook v. Stokes
Brothers42 which adopted a duty approach to liability for negligently in-
"Ilo at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
"Icl.; Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 653-54, 207 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1973).3
'Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal: Rptr. 72, 75 (1968). See
generally, supra notes 8-24 and accompanying text.
3613 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
3146 MIss. L.J. 871, 872 (1975); Note, MentalDistress-The Impact Rule, 42 U.M.K.C.L.
REV. 234 (1973).3
'Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897).39The Privy Council had held only,
[Their Lordships] are of the opinion that the first question, whether the
damages are too remote, should have been answered in the affirmative, and
on that ground, without saying that "impact" is necessary, that the judg-
ment should have been for the defendants.
Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 226 (1888).
4.[1901] 2 K.B. 669. Directly on point, Justice Kennedy asks,
[i]f impact be not necessary, and if... the fear is proved to have naturally and
directly produced physical effects, so that the ill results of the negligence
which caused the fear are as measurable in damages as the same results would
be if they arose from an actual impact, why should not an action for these
damages lie just as well as it lies where there has been an actual impact?
Id. at 675.
1d
411925] 1 K.B. 141.
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flicted emotional distress. Today, breach of duty remains the test of emo-
tional distress liability in England.43
The word "duty," however, may be a misnomer for this test, for, when
the English courts refer to "duty" in emotional distress cases, they con-
template "foreseeability." This point is aptly illustrated by noting that,
in Hambrook, both Lord Bankes 44 and Lord Sargent45 said they were
using a duty analysis but ended up using a foreseeability test to decide
the case. Eighteen years later the English courts were still substituting
foreseeability for duty as all five of the Lords in Bourhill v. Young, 46 a
noted progeny of Hambrook, used foreseeability as the test of liability for
emotional distress.
As might be expected, some United States courts have adopted the
English foreseeability approach in much the same way as others picked
up the impact and zone of danger rules.47 The leading American case on
foreseeability of emotional distress is Dillon v. Legg.4 The Dillon court
rejected both the impact and zone of danger rules and adopted the zone of
emotional danger rule which allows recovery where defendant should
have foreseen "fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury
in a person normally constituted. ' 49 But, as the Tobin court pointed out
in adopting the zone of danger rule, "foreseeability, once recognized, is
not so easily limited. '5 0
Recognizing the need to limit liability," the Dillon court introduced
three factors to consider in determining foreseeability: nearness of the
plaintiff to the accident, whether plaintiff witnessed the accident, and
closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim.5 2
However well these guidelines serve to limit liability, they also provide
distinctions which are as arbitrary and artificial as those provided by the
impact and zone of danger rules.5 3 A mother's distress is likely to be just
"See R. PERCY, CHARLESWORTH ON NEGLIGENCE 95-103 (6th ed. 1977).44[1925] 1 K.B. 141, 148-51.
4"Id. at 162-63.
4[1943] A.C. 92, 98, 101-02, 104-05, 111, 116-17. For another English case using
foreseeability as the test of duty, see Boardman v. Sanderson [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (C.A.).
4"St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402,64 S.W. 226 (1901); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 169-74, 472
P.2d 509, 518-21 (1970) (Rodrigues closely follows the duty approach, although subsequent
cases decided by the Hawaii Supreme Court limit Rodrigues to its facts and use a
foreseeability test. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Inc., 56 Haw. 204, 208-09, 532
P.2d 673, 676 (1975)); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me.
1970); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900), Dave Snelling
Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App. 1974); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.
2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
4868 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). For a discussion of the fact situa-
tion in Dillon, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
"Id at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
5024 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
"Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 741-46, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 921-24, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
79, 81-84 (1968).
111d. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
"See id. at 749-50, 441 P.2d at 926. 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Buirke, J. dissenting).
1979]
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as real when she hears the screech of tires and looks out the kitchen win-
dow to see her child lying mangled on the curb, or when she sees the in-
jured child brought home from an accident, as it is when she witnesses
the accident from the curb.
Both the Dillon court5 4 and the English courts"5 base defendant's duty
to plaintiff on foreseeability standards. In the standard conception of du-
ty this is wholly improper. Leon Green writes:
[H]owever valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding
a jury or judge to reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is
altogether inadequate for use by the judge as a basis of deter-
mining the duty issue and its scope..
... It is [the judges] and they only who can say whether the
risk that has brought injury to the victim shall be borne by the
defendant, if the other issues are found favorably to the plain-
tiff. This is the law-making or law-declaring function of the
courts and its range extends far beyond the range of the
reasonable man's foresight, or the foresight of anyone. Here it
is always hindsight that must be relied on for judgment-hind-
sight that may call into play far-flung considerations affecting
the welfare of persons not parties to the litigation, for "we the
people" have a stake in every litigation and our interests can-
not be ignored.55
DUTY
Since Chief Justice Cardozo's announcement of the Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad5 7 decision in 1928, it has become firmly established in
American law that, "before negligence can be predicated of a given act,
back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual com-
plaining . ,,8 There are no artificial cutoff points or mechanical tests in
this concept of duty. Duty, in its purest form, is "the sum total of those
5IL at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
"See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
"Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoL. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1961). See also
Linden, Down with Foreseeability! Of Thin Skulls and Rescuers, 47 CAN. BAR REv. 545,548
(1969); Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law (pt. 2), 9
COL. L. REV. 136, 138-45 (1909). And lest this conception of duty be thought to be solely a
product of academia, it should be noted that this view of duty has support in courts as well
as the law-journals. E.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 354-57, 367 N.E.2d
1250, 1253-57 (1977); Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 210-14, 267 So. 2d 714,
718-19 (1972); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 418-21, 224 N.W.2d
843, 854-56 (1975) (Levin, J. dissenting); Mayer v. Housing Auth. of Jersey City, 44 N.J.
567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 650-51, 338 A.2d 524,
528 (1975); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 530-31, 317 A.2d 494, 501
(1974).
57248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
581d. at 342, 162 N.E at 99-100 (Quoting McSherry, C.J., in West Virginia Cent. & P. Ry.
v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669. 671 (1903)).
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considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection."59
In determining whether the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, the
court must weigh all of the policy considerations favoring compensating
the plaintiff for his injury against those favoring limiting the defendant's
liability,60 and then consider the effect on society of allowing or dis-
allowing recovery.6 1 This societal view is what Green calls the "third
phase of the judicial process ' 62 because it extends beyond the interests of
the immediate parties to the litigation and takes into consideration the
interests of "we the people," society at large.
In weighing the competing interests, there will be a different set of
variables to balance in each significantly different case; consequently,
this duty analysis does not admit of any formula. 63 Such arbitrary,
mechanical barriers to recovery as the impact rule, the zone of danger
rule, and the foreseeability test 64 can not suffice. Leon Green writes:
Despite the intricacies involved, despite our incapacity to deal
appreciatingly with all the conflicting interests even in the
easiest case, can we rationally escape the attempt? The fact re-
mains that whatever judgment is passed some interest is
favored and some other disfavored. The risk is made to fall one
way or the other as certainly as judgment is rendered. But
shutting our eyes, stopping our ears, resorting to doubtful for-
mulas or other device of chance, does not mean that judgment
is escaped nor that it is an intelligent and acceptable judg-
ment. It merely means that we have been saved the painful
process of rational judging......
Does not the problem shake down to one of weighing the in-
terests involved and apportioning the risks according to the
dictates of that "will-of-the-wisp" justice we think so much
of 65
It is important to remember that the reason the courts are using such
formulas as the impact rule, the zone of danger rule, and the foreseeabil-
ity test is to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability of an admit-
tedly negligent defendant.66 But in answering the question of whether it
is fair to hold the defendant responsible for the harm to the plaintiff, a
"W. PROSSER. supra note 3, at 325-26.
"Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 518-19 (1970).
"Green, supra note 56, at 1417-18.
"Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1959).
"Green writes, "The process which leaves the problem a wide open one in every case, re-
quiring the consideration of economic and social interests on the broadest scales, offers a
variable rule where only variableness obtains." L. GREEN. RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE. 70-71 (1927).
"See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 402-04, 410, 520 P.2d 758, 761-63, 765-66 (1974).
"L. GREEN, supra note 63, at 198.
66See supra nn. 23, 30, & 51 and accompanying text.
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catchword formula cannot be expected to be a very useful tool. What is
needed is a detailed analysis of the policy considerations that the case
presents. 67 Such an approach is embodied in the duty analysis.
To say "duty" is one thing; to use "duty" is quite another. The in-
tricacies and the number of competing interests involved are enormous.
Consequently, courts often say that they are using the duty approach,
but slip off this analysis and turn the case on the mechanical foreseeabil-
ity test.'6 Such has been the case with the English courts,"9 however,
within the last ten years, in general tort cases not involving emotional
distress, the courts of England have finally begun to discuss and weigh
the policy considerations involved in each case, no longer choosing to
hide behind the facile foreseeability test.70 Although the English courts
have not yet used this new duty approach in emotional distress cases, the
growing use of the doctrine in other areas suggests that English im-
plementation of the duty analysis in the emotional distress area is in-
evitable.
Many advocates of the duty approach leave their audience with little
idea of exactly what this approach is; 71 therefore, it is necessary here to
take an in-depth look at what a duty analysis really involves. Although
the policy considerations which will lead the courts to impose a duty will
vary from case to case, several considerations will arise frequently, and
flexibility must be the rule. One consideration, articulated by courts
since the inception of the emotional distress tort,72 is the possibility of
'
7Linden, supra note 56, at 548.61For example, the Dillon court writes, "Since the chief element in determiniing whether
defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that fac-
tor will be of prime concern in every case." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d
912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968). But the Dillon court goes on to equate foreseeability
with duty and turns the case on the lack of foreseeability. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
6 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.7 Symmons, The Duty of Care in Negligence: Recently Expressed Policy Elements, 34
MODERN L. REV. 394 (1971). Symmons' article presents a frank recognition and analysis of
the English courts' rectification of the problem that faces the American courts in their use
of foreseeability as the test of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Com-
pare this brief quotation of Symmons to the state of the American law in the courts using
the foreseeability test (supra note 47):
In retrospect, until as recently as the 1960's, . . . reasonable foreseeability
has been used by the courts [of England] as a convenient facade behind which
they could extend, or restrict extension of, the existing categories of
negligence .... Consequently, in creating "notional" duties of care in novel
"situation-patterns" in the past, the courts have been accused of concealing
the true judicial process by their reticence in articulating underlying policy
considerations and their almost inevitable resort to the vague and facile test
of reasonable foreseeability to determine this highly importait issue.
Within the last ten years, however, almost dramatically, English courts
seem to have taken the cue from their Commonwealth counterparts and
begun openly to analyze and discuss policy elements in such cases.
Symmons, supra at 394.
"See, e.g., Comment, A New Boundary for Zone of Peri 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 125, 129-30.
"Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Mitchell v.
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fraudulent claims.73 In each case the court must consider the strength of
the assurances that the claim involves a "genuine and serious" mental
distress. 7' One standard available to test the authenticity of plaintiff's
claim is how a reasonable person in his situation would have reacted.
7 5
Using this standard would relieve the courts of the felt need to put up ar-
tificial barriers to recovery, such as the requirement of resulting physical
injuries. 7 Emotional distress can be just as real whether it manifests
itself in physical injuries or not, and the reasonable person standard
takes this into account.
Evidence of resulting physical injuries is acceptable as an indication of
the degree of emotional distress plaintiff suffered.7 7 The seriousness of an
injury is a very important consideration; however, the impact of this in-
jury on the plaintiff must be balanced against the impact on the defen-
dant resulting from the imposition of unduly burdensome liability.7 8 In
balancing these impacts of injury and liability, the Hawaii Supreme
Court in the case of Rodrigues v. State79 presents four reasons for
limiting recovery only to claims of serious mental distress. First, minor
emotional shocks are inevitable consequences of everyday living. Second,
social controls may provide a more effective means for dealing with the
infliction of small degrees of emotional distress than do legal controls.
Third, some kinds of emotional anguish may be beneficial. Fourth, the
law should not countenance the neurotic patterns in society. 0 Similarly,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court concludes that where the plaintiff's
emotional injury is extremely severe, the courts should be much more
willing to impose liability on the defendant than where plaintiff's injury
is merely a "minor psychic shock.""'
A further policy consideration, it has been suggested,8 2 is who, between
the two parties, can best bear the loss. "While society has no interest, of
course, in the mere shifting of a loss, it does benefit from the wide and
regular distribution of losses." 83 Often the question tacitly turns upon
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Kalen v. Terre Haute &
I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 698 (1897).
73Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969); D'Ambra v. United
States, 114 R.I. 643, 654-55, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975).
7
'Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970).
T Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
7'Leong v. Takaski, 55 Haw. 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974).
77Id.
"'Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172-73, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); D'Ambra v. United
States, 114 R.I. 643, 653, 338 A.2d 524, 529 (1975); See generally Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,
615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
1152 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
80I at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520.
OID'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 653, 338 A.2d 524, 529 (1975).
"Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 2), 29 COL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1929).
"3Heuston, The Law of Torts in 1960, 6 J. Soc PuB. TCHRS. L. 26, 30-31 (1961).
1979]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
whether defendant is likely to have insurance, 4 thus enabling the loss to
be broadly spread across society via the insurance company.
The courts should also look at the utility of defendant's conduct:
Another policy factor which is gaining increasing attention
from the courts is whether the imposition of a duty of care will
cause the class of persons on whom it would potentially fall to
be so circumspect in their work that, on balance, the public at
large would suffer to an unreasonable degree. This factor...
has particular relevance to the professions which render public
services .... 85
This policy factor breaks down into simple economic theory. Any defen-
dant which is a business has a cost of doing business, and if a court im-
poses tort liability on the defendant requiring payment of damages, then
his cost of doing business increases. At the point where this increase
makes defendant's costs higher than his income, the business will be
operating at a loss, and if operation at a loss continues for any ap-
preciable length of time, the defendant will be forced out of business.
Both losing the value of defendant's services and allowing the injured
plaintiff to go uncompensated will have costs to society. The result which
causes society the greatest loss should be the outcome that the court's
decision seeks to prevent.
Deterrence of future tortious conduct is another policy factor.
Although compensation is the primary function of the tort law, a sub-
sidiary function is prevention of future losses.86 This latter goal is bal-
anced by the feasibility and costs of conduct avoidance. If defendant can-
not avoid this type of conduct in the future, imposing liability on him will
not deter him or others similiarly situated. Likewise, using the same
economic analysis as above, if the costs to defendant, and thus to society,
of avoiding the conduct in the future are greater than the costs to society
of allowing plaintiff to go uncompensated, then society benefits economi-
cally by not imposing a duty on the defendant.
A further policy consideration is the ease of administering the decision.
As Green has stated,
there is nothing so weighty with court-room government as the
workability of a rule or process .... A Court will not knowingly
enter upon a course of dealing which it cannot finish, or that
may bring down upon it an increase in business or a mass of
problems which it is not prepared to handle.87
These are simply practical considerations which acknowledge that there
"D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 654, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975); Sysumons, The
Duty of Care in Negligence: Recently Expressed Policy Elements (pt. 2), 34 MODERN L.
REV. 528, 539 (1971).
8
"Symmons, supra note 84, at 528.
86Hueston, supra note 83, at 30.
7 Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014, 1035 (1928).
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are limitations on how much judges can do. However, as indicated
earlier,8 these considerations should not be afforded a great deal of
weight.
Even foreseeability is a policy consideration which must be taken into
account in evaluating liability. But this is foreseeability in the narrow
sense, not the broad sense in which it was used in Dillon and the English
cases. 9 Perhaps the term foreseeability has such a well recognized
meaning in the broader sense that foreseeability in the narrow sense
should be called "moral culpability" in order to distinguish it:
[F]oreseeability is responsive only to the moral aspects of the
issue; it tracks the moral postulate that one must be in a posi-
tion to be aware of what one is doing before one should be held
responsible for it. This is not to say that foreseeability fails as
a functional concept in tort law, but only that it should not be
pushed beyond its inherent limitations as a conclusion to the
question of whether there exists sufficient moral culpability
for legal liability to be imposed.9
This discussion necessarily does not cover every possible considera-
tion, since these will vary with the fact patterns, and many more may
emerge. As Green has pointed out, this duty analysis "offers a variable
rule where only variableness obtains."9' Nonetheless, the discussion is in-
dicative of the direction a duty analysis should take.
The concept of duty has not been a stranger to the Indiana courts,
which have held, in areas other than emotional distress, that duty,
breach, and injury resulting therefrom, constitute actionable
negligence.92 They have also noted that the existence of a duty is a pure
question of law for the courts to decide.93 Regrettably, a recent Indiana
court turned the question of duty, in a case not involving emotional
distress, on the test of foreseeability94 as did the Dillon and English
courts in emotional distress cases.95 As already discussed,98 this is wholly
improper: an extension of the foreseeability test, by the Indiana courts,
into the emotional distress area should be guarded against.
CONCLUSION
The paths to ascertaining emotional distress liability are many. The
impact rule, the zone of danger rule, and the foreseeability test have all
"8See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
9"D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 650-51, 338 A.2d 524, 528 (1975).
91L. GREEN. supra note 63, at 70-71.
"Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 610-11, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974); Harris v. Indiana
Gen. Serv. Co., 206 Ind. 351, 356, 189 N.E. 410, 412 (1934).
93Miner v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 610-11, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974); Union Traction Co.
v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 520-21, 121 N.E. 655, 657 (1919).
9"Geyer v. City of Logansport, - Ind. App. -,-, 346 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1976).
"'See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
9"Supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
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been brought to America from English roots." Now the innovative
English courts are moving away from the foreseeability test of duty and
using the policy analysis approach in an increasing number of cases.98 It
seems likely that the courts of England will eventually apply this new du-
ty approach to the emotional distress area. But American courts need not
wait to follow English initiative in adopting rules in the emotional
distress area. They should consider shifting the test of emotional distress
claims from inadequate mechanical rules to the flexible duty analysis.
There are only two rational alternatives regarding tort liability for
negligently inflicted emotional distress: denial of recovery because the
plaintiff's interests in not being subjected to emotional distress are not
legally protected, or allowance of recovery where plaintiff can show duty,
negligence and causation. Any rule that rests on an intermediate ground
is an arbitrary, illogical barrier to recovery. "Legal history shows that ar-
tificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process
will not work, usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time,
descend into oblivion." 99 With the Indiana court evidencing a willingness
to change its old rule,100 adoption of the duty analysis would be a timely,
laudable advance in Indiana law.
DAVID B. MILLARD
"See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968).
'"°See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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